











































Altruism and vaccination intentions
Citation for published version:
Cucciniello, M, Pin, P, Imre, B, Porumbescu, GA & Melegaro, A 2021, 'Altruism and vaccination intentions:
Evidence from behavioral experiments', Social Science and Medicine.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.114195
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.114195
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Published In:
Social Science and Medicine
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 22. Dec. 2021
Social Science & Medicine xxx (xxxx) xxx
Please cite this article as: Maria Cucciniello, Social Science & Medicine, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.114195
Available online 13 July 2021
0277-9536/© 2021 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Altruism and vaccination intentions: Evidence from behavioral experiments 
Maria Cucciniello a,b, Paolo Pin c,d, Blanka Imre e,i, Gregory A. Porumbescu f,h, 
Alessia Melegaro b,g,* 
a University of Edinburgh Business School, Scotland, UK 
b Dondena Centre for Research in Social Dynamics and Public Policy, Bocconi University, Italy 
c Department of Economics and Statistics, Università di Siena, Italy 
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A B S T R A C T   
Vaccine hesitancy has been on the rise throughout the past two decades, especially in high income countries 
where existing pro-vaccination public health communication strategies have proven ineffective. We argue that 
appealing to other-regarding preferences is one way of improving the effectiveness of public health communi-
cation strategies. To test this argument, we assess how vaccination intentions are influenced by the presence of 
people who cannot vaccinate, such as the immunosuppressed, newborns or pregnant women, using a laboratory 
experiment where there is a passive player whose welfare depends on the decisions of other, active players. 
Results suggest that pro-vaccine messages targeting altruism can increase vaccination intentions by: (i) invoking 
past experiences of dependence and vulnerability; (ii) stressing cooperation as a social norm; and (iii) empha-
sizing the presence of vulnerable individuals in a given society.   
1. Introduction 
Despite great progress in infectious disease control and prevention 
during the past century, infectious pathogens continue to pose a serious 
threat. This threat is clearly exemplified by the current CoVID-19 
pandemic, but also by past experiences with SARS, H1N1 influenza, 
Ebola, and resurgent measles outbreaks, all of which have drastically 
disrupted everyday’s life, diminished public health resources and 
dominated media headlines. 
Vaccines, when available, represent one of the most significant, cost- 
effective and safe public health interventions capable of mitigating such 
outbreaks (Ehreth, 2003; Ozawa et al., 2012; Gessner et al., 2017). 
However, vaccine hesitancy has become alarmingly widespread over the 
last two decades, especially in higher income nations (Larson et al., 
2016) where vaccine refusal has steadily increased, and routine immu-
nisation coverage for infectious diseases, such as measles, has decreased 
over time (WHO, WHO-UNICEF coverage estimates, 2017). As a result of 
this trend, many wealthier countries increasingly find themselves 
struggling to contain measles outbreaks, with significant ramifications 
for public health (Mulholland et el., 2012). For example, in 2019, the 
United States reported its highest number of cases in 25 years, while four 
countries in Europe – Albania, the Czech Republic, Greece, and the 
United Kingdom – lost their measles elimination status in 2018 
following protracted outbreaks (WHO, 2019). 
The prevalence of vaccine refusal as well as subsequent re-emergence 
of measles and, more generally, vaccine preventable diseases (VPD) is 
partially associated with vaccine hesitancy. According to the WHO 
Strategic Group of Experts (MacDonald, 2015), vaccine hesitancy is a 
complex behavioral concept that is context and vaccine-specific, and 
defined as “a delay in acceptance or refusal of vaccines despite avail-
ability of vaccination services” (Bedford et al., 2018). Current attitudes 
toward vaccines in high income countries stem from a prolonged period 
of largely sub-optimal vaccine uptake that began in 1998, following a 
publication documenting a causal link between the trivalent vaccine 
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against measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) and autism in children, 
which was later retracted for scientific fraud (Dyer, 2010). Despite the 
retraction, the paper resulted in a preponderance of sensationalised re-
ports of adverse vaccine events (Fefferman et al., 2015). 
Of great concern is not only the potential for vaccine hesitancy to 
undermine benefits of past immunisation efforts and eliminate herd 
immunity, but also the ability of rhetoric appealing to vaccine hesitancy 
to persist in the long term, despite authoritative dismissals (Madsen 
et al., 2002, Taylor et al., 2014). In response to the surge in vaccine 
hesitancy, public health authorities have released several technical re-
ports that summarise and address concerns about vaccines, and have 
also developed interventions aimed at increasing vaccination rates 
(ECDC, 2017). Specifically, the WHO SAGE vaccine hesitancy working 
group and the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(WHO, 2014, ECDC, 2015a, b and 2016) find that, while reasons for 
vaccine hesitancy are multifaceted and vary across vaccines, time, and 
regions, the most widespread sources of vaccine hesitancy are: i) fear of 
vaccine side effects, ii) perceived low risk of vaccine preventable dis-
eases (VPD), and iii) mistrust in health care providers. However, studies 
demonstrate that efforts to mitigate these sources of vaccine hesitancy 
typically prove unsuccessful and may even result in greater vaccine 
hesitancy (Nyhan et al. 2013, 2014, Nyhan and Reifler, 2015). In turn, 
many acknowledge additional factors need to be further explored to 
better address vaccine hesitancy (Holzmann and Wiedermann, 2019). 
To this end, one approach to mitigating vaccine hesitancy that has 
received less attention is to trigger altruistic behavior. The idea is that 
prompting greater concern for others’ welfare may lead individuals to 
vaccinate even when the coverage level is above herd immunity and the 
incentive to free-ride is high (Chapman et al., 2012; Shim et al., 2012). 
In a vaccination context, altruistic behavior can be evoked by drawing 
public attention to individuals who cannot vaccinate. Indeed, many 
categories like newborn babies or immunodepressed people, because of 
their medical conditions, are exempted from vaccination and are criti-
cally dependent on herd immunity and on the actions that other people 
take (among which, vaccinating) to protect themselves from the disease. 
Empirical studies that link vaccination and altruism are limited and 
belong to a fairly recent line of research. Extant evidence points to a 
positive relationship between altruism and stated vaccination intentions 
(Shim et al., 2012). There are different factors that underpin this 
relationship. 
For example, Böhm et al. (2016) suggest that making the vaccination 
context salient is critical to activating the link between altruism and 
vaccine uptake. In particular Böhm et al. (2016) develop an interactive 
vaccination game to compare uptake under neutral and a vaccination 
wording, documenting a positive effect of prosocial behaviours on 
vaccine uptake. In a controlled laboratory experiment, they show that 
prosocial individuals, i.e. those who also regard the outcomes of others 
in their decisions, are more likely to vaccinate than proself individuals, 
who focus solely on their own outcome. For instance, when framing the 
game as a vaccination decision, individuals’ general attitude towards 
real-life vaccination predicts vaccine uptake in a supposedly artificial 
game. 
Other studies emphasize the importance of communicating the im-
plications of vaccinating, demonstrating that explanations of how 
vaccinating can reduce danger to vulnerable segments of the population 
increases vaccination intentions (Rieger, 2020). Vietri et al. (2012) show 
that individuals are sensitive to the amount of good they feel they are 
doing for others by vaccinating. That is, individual motivation for 
vaccinating is not entirely driven by a desire to protect others, but also 
by a desire to feel good about one’s self. 
This paper adds to our understanding of the relationship between 
altruism and vaccination intentions by offering insight into the different 
avenues through which altruism can impact vaccination intentions. 
We expect that decisions to vaccinate can be motivated by a desire to 
protect vulnerable segments of the population that are unable to get 
vaccinated for medical reasons, such as those who are 
immunocompromised, or for safety concerns as is the case of newborns 
and pregnant women (Bergin et al., 2018). We also predict that the link 
between altruism and vaccination intentions will be stronger among 
those who were unable to vaccinate at some point in their own life. Built 
into this argument is an assumption that, because individuals are 
motivated by a desire to protect the health of those who are unable to 
vaccinate, the link between altruism and vaccination intentions will be 
stronger in a public health setting. That is, because people care about 
public health outcomes, we expect to see greater cooperation using a 
more explicit (i.e., vaccine-related) communication strategy rather than 
a neutral one. Finally, noting work on processing fluency, which shows 
that attitudes toward a message are impacted by the perceived ease of 
processing the message (Foster et al., 2013) and that reliance on details 
(i.e., numeric descriptors) to convey information makes message pro-
cessing more difficult (Porumbescu et al., 2017), we expect that the 
inclusion of more details in a message will render it less effective when 
compared to simpler messages. 
To empirically assess these expectations, we conducted a laboratory 
experiment with graduate students in an Italian University. We used this 
laboratory experiment also to test the effect of framing (vaccination vs. 
neutral) and the level of detail of the narratives (high detail and nu-
merical vs. low detail and narrative). To thoroughly explore the de-
terminants of the decision-making process we asked participants in the 
laboratory experiment to play thirty rounds of the game, either as active 
or passive players. The advantage of having players play multiple rounds 
of the game is that we are able to more closely approximate the way 
individuals learn from stimuli when making complex decisions in a real 
world setting. We revisit this issue later in the manuscript. As we 
explain, the results from the laboratory experiment highlight the 
importance of altruistic behavior in vaccination decisions and allow us 
to better disentangle the mechanisms in place. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces our experi-
mental methods and the laboratory experiment. Section 3 presents 
findings, and Section 4 discusses the main implications of the study. 
2. Methods 
To test our expectations, we conducted a laboratory game experi-
ment using a sample of Italian university students, whereby subjects 
received monetary payoffs according to answers they gave and, as a 
consequence, the outcome of the game. This approach is supported by 
substantive evidence that choices made in simple games predict people’s 
behavior with respect to real-world social choices (Charness and Rabin, 
2002), even in the presence of a global pandemic (Campos-Mercade 
et al., 2020). 
2.1. Two and three-player game 
The proposed experiment consisted of a two- or three-player variant 
of the Hawk-Dove game (Neugebauer et al., 2008) with a risk dominant 
strategy (Fig. 1) and payoffs being the experimental tokens that players 
could earn. In the two-player game, both participants were active and 
could decide among two strategies that initially were framed in neutral 
terms (Choice 1 and Choice 2): a risk-free strategy that provides a pos-
itive externality for the other player (i.e., a co-operative strategy that 
provides the same payoff no matter what the other player does), and a 
risky strategy that pays off only if the other player is playing the risk-free 
strategy (i.e., a non-cooperative strategy that pays off only if the other 
person plays the co-operative strategy). In the three-player game, the 
third player had no choice (passive player) in the sense that he/she 
could not decide on the strategy and his/her final payoff was completely 
determined by the strategy chosen by the other two active players. 
Both the two-player and three-player games have two pure Nash 
equilibria strategies where one player plays the cooperative action 
(Choice 1) and the other the selfish action (Choice 2). These are also the 
strategy profiles that players should aim for if they wanted to maximize 
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total social surplus, in the sense that they maximize the sum of all 
payoffs, even when the passive player is present. 
Note first that, as payoffs do not change for the two active players 
when the third player is added, if those two active players are selfish, the 
Nash equilibria does not change in the three-player game. 
Note also that there is a trade-off between what is best for the passive 
player and for society: the total surplus is higher (17 versus 15) if only 
one active player chooses the cooperative action but the passive player is 
much better off if both cooperate (5 versus 2). In addition, the game was 
designed to make the payoff difference between the uncooperative and 
the cooperative action very salient by assigning a payoff that is notice-
ably higher (two digits and double the cooperative payoff) for the free- 
rider action. Both of these design elements have been introduced to 
highlight the attractiveness of uncooperative behavior so that the 
cooperative choice can be more confidently interpreted as a sign of 
altruism. 
The above design mimics the tradeoff between vaccinating and not 
vaccinating in a real-world decision context, even when the game is 
framed in neutral terms. There is a risk-free decision that is collaborative 
(representing vaccination) and a risky decision to free ride on the 
behavior of others (i.e. no vaccination). Both players are slightly better 
off if one cooperates and the other does not, when compared to what 
would happen if both cooperated. This is because the player who free-
rides is protected by herd immunity while not incurring in any personal 
cost (i.e., risks associated to the vaccines). The worst outcome is ob-
tained when no one cooperates. In the three-player version of the game, 
the passive player mimics those who cannot get vaccinated and relies on 
other people choosing the cooperative strategy to achieve herd immu-
nity to keep their personal risk of getting infected under control. The 
best outcome for the passive player occurs when both active players 
cooperate, whereas the worst outcome occurs when no one cooperates. 
The two active players in the game are aware of the presence of the third 
passive player and the way that player’s payoff depends on active 
players’ cooperative or uncooperative actions. 
In addition to the neutral framing, we also consider three other 
variants of the game where wording related to vaccination was made 
explicit (see online Supplementary material for details). The first variant 
of the game with vaccination wording labelled the two actions as 
Vaccinate and Don’t Vaccinate instead of Choice 1 and Choice 2, 
respectively. In the other two variants of the game, a prompt on the 
importance of vaccination was shown to participants at the beginning of 
the session. In the first variant, the prompt had a non-technical framing 
with no numbers (low detail framing); in the second, a technical framing 
was used whereby some statistics were included in the message (high 
detail framing). All details about experimental instructions and prompts 
are in the online Supplementary material. In a real-world context, we 
imagine the two prompts (low and high details) act as two alternative 
types of vaccination campaign, with different levels of technical 
information. 
2.2. Laboratory experiment design 
Participants were students in an Italian university, recruited in April 
2018 via an experimental laboratory recruitment system. Through the 
recruiting system, in the days preceding the actual experiment, subjects 
were asked to fill in a brief survey on individual characteristics that we 
believe could affect their behavior in the game, including demographics, 
health, and social preferences variables (Table A1 in the Appendix). 
The experiment consisted of a mixed 2 (number of players: two or 
three) x 2 (framing: neutral or vaccination) x 3 (detail: no prompt, low 
detail prompt, high detail prompt) design (see also Table 1 below). 
Framing and detail were minor treatments of the experiment, we use 
them to control for robustness consistency and as a check for external 
validity of our results. Detail was used only in the context of the vacci-
nation wording and was always a between-subjects factor in the sense 
that participants received at the beginning of the session one of the three 
detail control options (i.e.; either no prompt, low detail or high detail 
prompt). 
The other two factors were between-subjects in some sessions and 
within-subjects in other sessions. In other words, we conducted sessions 
where participants played either the two-player or the three-player 
game with a change in framing after a given number of rounds; and 
sessions where framing was fixed but subjects played the two-player 
game for some rounds and the three-player game afterwards. The re-
petitive design of the laboratory experiment enabled us to also study the 
role of learning in the decision process, by having subjects play several 
rounds of the game with different major and minor treatments. During 
each laboratory session, subjects played thirty rounds of the game, 
divided into two parts, the first 9 rounds (First block) and the remaining 
Fig. 1. Game with Neutral Wording. a) Original two-player game where the two players are both active; b) Three-player game where a third passive player is added 
and the payoffs of the two original active players are unchanged. In the online Supplementary material a version of this game with vaccination wording is presented 
where only the names of the actions change. 
Table 1 
Session Summary. For each of the 16 sessions we list the number of participants 
and the type of treatment, across two dimensions: number of players and 
framing. One of the dimensions was kept fixed, and the other varies after 9 or 10 
















1 24 10 + 30 2 Neutral, then 
vaccination 
– 
2 26 10 + 30 2 Neutral, then 
vaccination 
High 
3 18 9 + 21 3 Neutral, then 
vaccination 
– 
4 27 9 + 21 3 Neutral, then 
vaccination 
High 
5 27 9 + 21 3 Neutral, then 
vaccination 
Low 
6 24 9 + 21 2-to-3 Neutral – 
7 18 9 + 21 2-to-3 Vaccination – 
8 24 9 + 21 2-to-3 Vaccination High 
9 24 9 + 21 2-to-3 Vaccination Low 
10 24 9 + 21 2-to-3 Neutral – 
11 24 9 + 21 3 Neutral, then 
vaccination 
Low 
12 24 9 + 21 3 Neutral, then 
vaccination 
High 
13 18 9 + 21 2-to-3 Neutral – 
14 24 9 + 21 2-to-3 Vaccination Low 
15 24 9 + 21 2-to-3 Neutral – 
16 24 9 + 21 2-to-3 Vaccination High  
M. Cucciniello et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Social Science & Medicine xxx (xxxx) xxx
4
21 rounds (Second block), with a single change of the features of the 
game in between: in each session, either the number of players varied 
and the framing was kept unchanged, or framing varied and the number 
of players was kept unchanged. 
For the two-to-three player games, the wording of the game was the 
same throughout the entire experimental session. However, participants 
played in pairs until round 9 and then switched to playing in groups of 
three. In some of the sessions where framing was not neutral, subjects 
were also shown a (high or low detail) prompt before they first played the 
game with vaccination wording. Under the high or low detail conditions, 
subjects had to read a text about the advantages of vaccination, that 
either included numerical digits or only wording. In the online Supple-
mentary Material we provide the complete statements for all wordings. 
In each main block where they played the three players version, we 
divided the participants in 3 equal groups (numbered 1, 2, 3 in Table 2) 
and also the rounds were divided in 3 equal sub-blocks. Subjects were 
rotated to play as either the active or the passive player, so that each 
group of subject played the passive role for an entire sub-block of 
rounds. So, in the main blocks in which we have 3- players, in the first 
sub-block of rounds none of the active players had experienced the 
condition of being passive, half of them had this experience in the sec-
ond sub-block, and finally all active players had this experience in the 
last sub-block. 
Table 2 shows this rotation within each main block variant, where 
we have assigned ID’s 1,2, and 3 to the three groups of players. Subjects 
did not know the group in which they were, but they could see during 
the rounds if they were active or passive. In the cases in which both 
variants main blocks had three players, we chose to change group 
composition from the first to the second main block, so as not to leave 
room for retaliation against opponents in the previous round. More in-
formation about the laboratory experiment recruitment and imple-
mentation process can be found in the Appendix. 
We assumed that participants might cooperate conditionally, 
meaning that the likelihood they cooperate increases in response to the 
(perceived) likelihood that others cooperate. In order to measure the 
perception of others cooperating, we elicited the belief of each partici-
pant in every round about the action of other active subjects in the same 
room (who were not in their group in that given round, and therefore 
whose actions were unobservable). Subjects were asked to guess the 
number of active players in the room who they thought chose the 
cooperative action (Choice 1 or Vaccinate, depending on the framing) in 
the game they had just played. 
Payoffs were given in experimental tokens (maximum 10 for each 
instance of both the belief elicitation exercise and the game) which were 
converted, at the end of the experiment, at a conversion rate known to 
subjects. The final payoff was determined by randomly selecting 4 
rounds from the overall 30 that were played by each study participant. 
For each of these four rounds, we randomly assigned as the final payoff 
either the outcome of the game, given the players’ decisions, or the 
payoff obtained by the same individual from the belief elicitation ex-
ercise. At the end of the session, the corresponding experimental tokens 
earned were summed and converted to euros at a rate of 1 token = 0.50 
Euros (maximum payoff per round was 5 Euros). In addition, partici-
pants received a participation fee of 5 Euros and the maximum overall 
amount that they could receive at the end of the experiment was 25 
Euros. The experiment was completely anonymous and study partici-
pants were paid with Amazon gift cards. 
2.3. Data analysis 
Our outcome of interest is the action of players in each round of their 
session: whether they played the cooperative or the uncooperative ac-
tion. Two types of sessions were run: one in which we kept the number of 
players fixed and changed framing, and one in which we kept the 
framing and changed the number of players. Only in the 3-player sce-
nario, we have our treatments of interest: the presence of a third player 
and also the experience of having been passive. Moreover, given the 
effect of rounds (Figure A1 in the Appendix), our treatment variables 
were correlated with our controls and with the rounds. 
Covariate balance checks are provided in the Appendix whereby we 
report separately uptake of the cooperative action for each control/ 
treatment variable at the participant-round level. Since balance does not 
hold for all covariates obtained from the survey, we present robustness 
checks where we control for these covariates in the regressions (see 
Appendix for details). More information on the measurement of the 
control variables and summary statistics on the sample can also be found 
in the Appendix. 
The main treatment variables that we consider in the model speci-
fication are the following: a treatment that is an indicator for the pres-
ence of a third player (0 if two-player game is played, 1 if three-player 
game is played) and a treatment that is an indicator of whether that 
subject had been previously passive (0 if the subject had not been pre-
viously passive, 1 if she/he had been previously passive). Indeed, by 
construction, in the 2-to-3 players’ sessions (session numbers: 6–10, 
13–16, see Table 1), no active player had any passive experience in 
rounds 10–16; in rounds 17–23, one half of the active players had been 
passive before; by round 24, all active players had some previous passive 
player experience.1 Minor treatments that we use as controls, as dis-
cussed above, are the framing (0 if neutral, 1 if vaccination), and the 
exposure to a low detail prompt (1 if low detail prompt is provided, 0 if 
no prompt) or to a high detail prompt (1 if high detail prompt is pro-
vided, 0 if no prompt). 
After each round every subject had to guess how many other active 
players had played the cooperative action in that round. 
Perceived cooperation refers to this personal guess, expressed in 
round numbers by the subject, about how many other active players’ 
were playing the cooperative action in that round (see details in the 
Appendix). We have then normalized this guess as the percentage of 
other subjects that the participant believes are cooperating, so that the 
regressor runs from 0 to 1, to homogenize across the session which were 
not uniform in the number of subjects. 
We consider also session fixed effects for our 16 sessions, which 
control for the fact that the composition of subjects’ behavior in each 
experimental session is different and may affect the overall evolution of 
behaviors. 
Among the 374 participants, we collected 328 complete surveys 
before the experiment, and we use some of that information as 
Table 2 
Illustrative case of a role allocation procedure for a session with three parteci-
pants who go through the 30 rounds, where the first 9 rounds represent the first 
main block of the game and the remaining 21 rounds represent the second main 
block. The three participants are labelled with the IDs 1, 2 and 3 and are allo-
cated to one role in each block of rounds (eg. participant no. 3 plays as an active 
player in the first three rounds, as a passive player in the second 3 rounds and as 
active again in the last 3 rounds of the first main block and similarly over the 
second main block of the game).  
Game Type Rounds Player’s role in the game 
Active Active Passive 
First main block 1–3 3 1 2 
4–6 1 2 3 
7–9 2 3 1 
Second main block 10–16 3 1 2 
17–23 1 2 3 
24–30 2 3 1  
1 Conversely, in the 3 players sessions (session numbers: 3–5, 11–12, see 
Table 1) no active player had any passive experience in rounds 1–3; in rounds 
4–6, one half of the active players had been passive before; by round 7, all 
active players had some previous passive player experience. 
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additional controls. In the Appendix we provide descriptive statistics on 
those variables. 
3. Results 
A total of 374 subjects participated in 16 sessions. The average up-
take values of study partecipants varied from 35% to 48%, depending on 
different controls and treatments (Tables A2 and A3). However, given 
the complexity of the experimental design, it was not possible to find the 
direct treatment effects from a simple comparison of means. 
In Fig. 2 we show model estimates using a reduced set of controls and 
in Table 3, we show estimates using a two-level linear probability and 
probit models, with an expanding set of controls and clustered errors, 
where we pool together all our observations (see also Tables A5-A6 in 
the Appendix). 
As anticipated, when discussing the effect of rounds, there is a 
negative effect of experience, which is significant in some of the model 
specifications, as every additional round of the game reduces the 
probability of collaborating by around 1–3 percentage points (Fig. 2 
below), in line with what happens typically in repeated behavioral ex-
periments (on this, see for example Andreoni, 1988, or Fischbacher, and 
Gachter, 2010). This effect is important because it implies correlation of 
the major and the minor treatments, that are themselves correlated with 
the flow of rounds because of the sessions’ design. 
The first two columns of each model specification (linear or probit) 
in Table 3 show that the presence of a third passive player alone does not 
have a clear effect. The reference condition is two-player, neutral 
wording, no detail, where the average uptake was the lowest one at 0.44 
and where the effect of a third player was the highest one (see Fig. 2 and 
Table A2 in the Appendix). For this reason, we find a negative coefficient 
for the presence of a third player in the first columns, which becomes 
positive and significant only when we interact it with framing and 
prompt and we add controls. 
Conversely, a strong pervasive and robust effect is found when 
considering the experience of being passive, which increases the prob-
ability of cooperation by around 30 percentage points with the simple 
model of Fig. 2 and by 46 percentage points in all the specifications in 
Table 3. These results are remarkably robust to changes in the model 
specification and to the inclusion of various controls (as shown in the 
Appendix). 
Perceived cooperation is also found to have a strong and significant 
effect. We have computed that for each additional subject in the same 
session that the player thinks is cooperating, there is an increase in the 
individual’s probability of uptake of 1–2%. 
As for the rest of the controls variables, vaccination wording has a 
significant positive effect on vaccine uptake that, however, reduces its 
significance as other controls, time interactions and individual charac-
teristics are included in the model specification. The linear estimates are 
not statistically significant. The estimated coefficients of the vaccination 
prompt, be it low or high detail, are insignificant, which suggests that 
they have no impact on cooperation. 
The probit estimates indicate an overall significant positive effect of 
vaccination wording, an increase of 9 percentage points in cooperation/ 
vaccine uptake (all marginal effects are in Table A7 in the Appendix). 
Additional tables showing the crude cooperation/vaccine uptake 
averages by control and treatment, marginal effects and various 
robustness checks are presented in the Appendix (Table A2, A3, and A7). 
4. Discussion 
Findings from our laboratory experiment offer three novel insights 
into the dynamic relationship between messaging strategies invoking 
altruistic behavior and vaccination intentions. First, our findings suggest 
conveying how actions affect the wellbeing of vulnerable groups may be 
an effective way of triggering more altruistic actions from individuals 
considering getting vaccinated. 
Second, they reveal that individuals who, at one time, belonged to a 
vulnerable group, are more inclined to vaccinate than those without 
such experience. Third, we show that subjects vaccinate more when they 
believe others vaccinate at higher rates. Our results also suggest vaccine 
Fig. 2. Graphical representation of the estimated 
coefficients of a simple regression model where the 
dependent variable is vaccination uptake and the 
sample has also been stratified according to the 
characteristics of the game. Vaccination and Neutral 
refer to the wording, while Low detail and High detail 
refer to the prompt within vaccination wording. 
“Neutral” and “Vaccination” are a partition of “All”. 
See Table A4 in the Appendix for additional details. 
Bars indicate the 95% confidence interval.   
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specific narratives do not significantly affect uptake, in line with Nyhan 
et al. (2013, 2014). 
Taken together, these findings make important contributions to 
vaccine hesitancy theory and practice. With respect to theory, our 
findings show that not only are individuals responsive to altruistic 
messaging, but also that certain characteristics of the individual 
(i.e., past experience being vulnerable) and their perceptions of social 
norms (i.e., belief that others vaccinate) also weigh on vaccination de-
cisions. One explanation for why past experience as the vulnerable 
player is so critical to vaccination intentions is that it may contribute to 
greater empathy with the plight of those unable to vaccinate. This aligns 
with research on the empathy-altruism hypothesis, which argues that 
“empathetic concern produces altruistic motivation” that may trigger 
decisions to vaccinate to help those unable to do so (Batson et al., 2015: 
260). We also find that the neutral framing is more effective than the 
vaccination wording for the third player scenario, with the difference 
driven by a strong negative reaction to the high detail wording for the 
vaccination treatment (in Fig. 2 and Table A4 in the Appendix). These 
findings align with previous work that examines vaccine messaging 
effectiveness through a lens of cognitive load theory. A key finding from 
this work is that the inclusion of details in messages encouraging 
vaccination suppresses forms of comprehension that are essential to 
persuading members of the public to vaccinate (Porumbescu et al., 
2020). In other words, attempting to persuade the public to vaccinate 
through the use of facts may backfire. With respect to practice, offer 
recommendations related to steps that can be taken to increase the 
effectiveness of efforts to reduce vaccine hesitancy and increase vacci-
nation intentions. For example, crafting messages that emphasize how 
many have already vaccinated and who benefits from vaccination may 
be effective strategies. Considering our results, drawing up experiences 
from the past of having been vulnerable may also be an effective strategy 
for inspiring altruistic behavior: define messaging campaigns invoking 
past experiences of dependence and vulnerability can increase 
vaccination intentions. These contributions notwithstanding, our find-
ings should be interpreted in light of limitations that pave the way for 
future research. One initial limitation relates to the nature of our sample. 
The experiment was conducted with students of an Italian University 
who are young and therefore unlikely to have real-world experience 
with being dependent on others from an immunisation perspective. A 
future research direction worth pursuing is to replicate our experiment 
with other subjects to investigate any moderating effects due to students 
status. A second limitation pertains to the fact that our study was con-
ducted in a laboratory setting, which raises questions over the extent to 
which our findings will translate into a real world context. While various 
measures were taken to mimic a real-world decision-making environ-
ment, to truly examine the generalizability of our findings field exper-
iments in real world settings are needed. A third limitation relates to the 
complexity of the experiment. However, if on one side we are aware that 
this complex design precludes some direct comparisons among treat-
ments, on the other side this allows us to study the effects of learning in 
an environment where, for each subject, only one major or minor 
treatment changed during the experiment. A fourth potential limitation 
of this study relates to the possible role of social context and (limited) 
experience with outbreaks plays in shaping relationships we have 
identified. To this end, it would be interesting to examine whether the 
findings we have uncovered in our study, conducted in the 
pre-coronavirus era where most of the population only had limited ex-
periences with outbreaks, generalize to the post-coronavirus era, where 
nearly the entire population has directly or indirectly been touched by a 
virus that is now considered a VPD. 
This last point is especially poignant in light of the recent release of a 
coronavirus vaccine. While scientists appear to have succeeded in the 
monumental task of developing a vaccine for coronavirus in less than a 
year, the world is now grappling with the equally important question of 
how to convince a hesitant public to vaccinate and to continue to engage 
in behaviors that safeguard those unable to vaccinate until herd 
Table 3 
Two-Level Linear and Probit Estimates. Data from a laboratory experiment with Italian University students (standard errors in parentheses).   
Dependent variable: vaccination uptake 
Model: linear Model: probit 
































































Belief about others’ cooperation   0.281*** 
(0.0277) 
0.306*** 





Has been passive   0.460*** 
(0.0161) 
0.455*** 





Session fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Round (quadratic) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Treatment interactions (3*V, 3*VLD, 3*VHD)   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Interactions with time (round); linear and quadratic   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Demographic controls  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Health controls  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Risk and social preferences controls  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Observations 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 
Number of participants 374 328 374 328 374 328 374 328 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.10,** p < 0.05,***p < 0.01. 
3*V Third player present*vaccination wording 3* VLD Third player present*vaccination wording with low detail prompt 3* VHD Third player present*vaccination 
wording with high detail prompt. 
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immunity is reached (Ball, 2020). For such a complex public health 
issue, a single solution is unlikely. Rather, governments will need to 
develop a portfolio of policy tools targeting vaccination hesitance, 
which will likely include different incentives, especially among those 
who perceive risks of coronavirus as being low. While the findings from 
this study are unable to directly map onto coronavirus vaccine behav-
iors, they do suggest governments would be wise to consider supple-
menting appeals to individual self-interest with altruistic messaging, 
social norm cues, and invoking memories of past vulnerability in their 
efforts to encourage individuals to vaccinate. 
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Appendix 1 
1. . Methods and Materials 
1.1. Experiment in the University Lab 
1.1.1. Recruitment. Participants were students at an Italian university, recruited in April 2018 via an experimental laboratory recruitment system. In 
the invitation email, we sent subjects a link to the online Qualtrics survey, explaining that if they had not filled in the survey before the laboratory 
session, they would not be allowed to participate. Upon finishing the survey, subjects received a random number that they had to present before they 
could enter the laboratory. The laboratory experiment itself was conducted May 3–10, 2018, with some pilot sessions run on May 3. Participants 
played forty rounds of the games on May 3 (pilot sessions), and thirty rounds on later days on a computer, at separate stations. The sessions were made 
shorter in order to comply with the laboratory schedule. To make the data comparable across sessions, observations pertaining to rounds 10, and 
31–40 were discarded for the sessions that had 40 rounds so as to align the data structure with the later sessions of 30 round containing 9 rounds of the 
first variant main block of the game played and 21 rounds of the second variant of the game played main block. The experiment was completely 
anonymous. We ran five sessions per day on May 3, May 7, and May 8, and two sessions per day on May 9 and 10. We discarded data from the first 
three sessions on May 3 because of technical problems that occurred during those sessions that made us discard the data. 
1.1.2. Payment. Study participants were paid with Amazon gift cards. In particular, at the end of the experiment, subjects were asked to sign a receipt 
for the gift card, corresponding to their earnings (details below), which was mailed to them by Amazon within a few weeks after the experiment. Since 
the laboratory had 27 stations and we needed the number of participants to be a multiple of six for some sessions, there were a few participants who 
had filled in the survey but could not participate in the laboratory session. They were paid 5 euros as a show-up fee using the same Amazon gift card 
process. The maximum amount paid overall was 25 euros. Subjects who participated in pilot sessions that were not used in the analysis were paid and 
those who took part in sessions we used data from were paid according to the same procedure. 
More precisely, players had two tasks to make at each round: the actual game and a guess on how many other active players had played the 
cooperative action in that round. With the game they could earn a maximum of 10 tokens. In the guessing task, at the end of each round, subjects were 
asked to select an integer (on a sliding scale) between 0 and M, where M was the number of active players in the game excluding those two that were 









number of players in session
number of active players
− 2⏟⏞⏞⏟
active players in own group
, if 2 player game
number of players in session*2/3
number of active players
− 2⏟⏞⏞⏟
active players in own group








Correct guesses were incentivized through a belief elicitation exercise whereby we assigned to players a payoff which was inversely related to the 
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where 10 represents the maximum payoff that could be generated here. 
At the end of the experiment, for each subject, we randomly drew 4 rounds and for each of them we payed to the participant either the actual game 
or the guess elicitation task. Since the maximum that could be earned in each round was 10 tokens, and we converted 1 token with 0.50 Euros, the 
maximum earning for each round was 5 Euros. 
1.1.3. Controls. We also collected data on the participants’ individual characteristics that we believe could affect their behavior in the game, 
including demographics, health, and social preferences variables. Demographic controls are gender, political views, religiousness, and highest edu-
cation achieved. Health variables include self-assessed general health (measured 0–100), the number of medical check-ups in the past year, the 
number of influenza shots received in the past 5 years, and an indicator if the subject’s doctor has ever advised him or her not to vaccinate against some 
disease. Social preferences are self-reported risk aversion, multiple price-list measured risk aversion, a categorical variable measuring positive 
reciprocity, self-reported altruism and a quantitative (donation-based) measure of altruism. The survey instruments used to measure these variables 
were taken from a set of validated survey items by Falk et al. (2016). We asked subjects to fill in a survey on Qualtrics aimed at finding out about their 
vaccination attitudes prior to the laboratory experiment. We also added question measuring risk aversion, altruism, and positive reciprocity from the 
Preference Module Laboratory Version by Falk et al. (2016), The Preference Survey Module: A Validated Instrument for Measuring Risk, Time, and 
Social Preferences, IZA Discussion Paper No. 9674. Some questions were directly taken from the Preference Module: Question 1 for risk aversion, 
Questions 7 and 8 for altruism, and Question 9 for positive reciprocity. We also used a modified version of Question 2 to measure risk aversion. We use 
some survey items as controls in the analysis, i. e gender, education, political view, self-evaluation of health condition, religious belief. The full survey 
will be made available upon request. 
1.1.4. Ethics. The experimental design was approved by Bocconi University Ethics Committee. 
1.1.5. Summary Statistics. Summary statistics of the covariates used from survey date can be found in Table A 1. The mean value of 152 Euros that our 
subjects would donate to a hypothetical charity is low compared to a general population, but it should be considered that we have a population of 
university students.  
Table A1 
Summary Statistics, Students  
Continuous variables Mean Standard deviation 
Altruism, donation (0–1000) 152.851 177.006 
Risk aversion, price list (2.6–9.4) 6.634 2.150 
General health (0–100) 76.046 14.850 
Flu shot number 1.512 1.692 
N 328  
Categorical variables N Column % 
Male 
No 151 46.0% 
Yes 177 54.0% 
Highest education achieved 
High school 246 75.0% 
Undergraduate 65 19.8% 
Graduate 17 5.2% 
Political views 
Strong liberal 31 9.5% 
Moderate liberal 203 61.9% 
Moderate conservative 53 16.2% 
Strong conservative 4 1.2% 
Populist 6 1.8% 
Libertarian 15 4.6% 
Other 16 4.9% 
Religiousness 
No 243 65.0% 
Yes 131 35.0% 
Number of medical check-ups in the past year 
None 124 37.8% 
1 107 32.6% 
2 62 18.9% 
3 18 5.5% 
3+ 17 5.2% 
Doctor ever advised not to vaccinate 
No 308 93.9% 
Yes 20 6.1% 
(continued on next page) 
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Table A1 (continued ) 
Continuous variables Mean Standard deviation 
Self-reported willingness to share (0–10) 
0 16 4.9% 
1 31 9.5% 
2 32 9.8% 
3 31 9.5% 
4 30 9.1% 
5 24 7.3% 
6 31 9.5% 
7 57 17.4% 
8 46 14.0% 
9 18 5.5% 
10 12 3.7% 
Positive reciprocity (1–6) 
1 36 11.0% 
2 81 24.7% 
3 81 24.7% 
4 60 18.3% 
5 47 14.3% 
6 23 7.0% 
Self-reported risk loving (0–10) 
0 8 2.4% 
1 12 3.7% 
2 30 9.1% 
3 41 12.5% 
4 39 11.9% 
5 22 6.7% 
6 50 15.2% 
7 61 18.6% 
8 48 14.6% 
9 13 4.0% 
10 4 1.2% 
Total 328 100.0%  
1.1.6. Baseline Cooperation/Vaccine Uptake by Control. See the cooperative choice/vaccine uptake decision averages in Table A2 and Table A3.  
TableA2 
Average Uptake by Control, Number of Players Varies   
2 players 3 players Difference 
























Standard deviation in parentheses.  
Table A3 
Average Uptake by Control, Wording Varies   
Neutral wording 2 players 
Vaccination wording 
Difference Neutral wording 3 players 
Vaccination wording 
Difference 




































Standard deviation in parentheses. 
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1.1.7. Pure effects of rounds
Fig. A1. Uptake level with respect to rounds, averaged across sessions, for those sessions where we kept three players and changed wording (left) and in the case in 
which we moved from two to three players (right). Both havea decreasing trend, which is evident in the right panel. 
1.1.8. Vaccination uptake: linear model. Table A4 shows the outcome of a simple linear model, with session fixed effects, on the probability of playing 
the cooperative action (a graphical representation is included in the main text, Fig. 2). In order to provide a clearer interpretation, we have also 
divided the pool of all our observations between neutral wording and vaccination wording (second and third columns) and then, among the latter, 
those with low detail and high detail specification (last two columns).  
Table A4 
Simple linear estimates for the whole sample and for different wording, with session fixed effects (standard errors in parentheses). The entire sample is partitioned in 
two groups: Neutral and Vaccination wording.   
Vaccination uptake: linear model 
Wording 
All Neutral Vaccination Vaccination low detail* Vaccination high detail* 








































Session fixed effects yes yes yes yes Yes 
Observations 11,220 4230 6990 2511 3057  
* Vaccination Low and High detail are disjoint subset of the rounds with the Vaccination framing (the Vaccination column includes High details, Low details and No 
prompt). 
1.1.9. Estimation strategy. We estimated two-level mixed effects models in the general form: 
Pr(yri = 1|xri)= H(xriβ + zriui)
where yri = 1 is the cooperative action (Choice 1/Vaccinate), r = 1, ..., 30 denotes rounds, i = 1, ..., I denotes subjects with I = 374 when no survey 
data is used and I = 328 when matched data is used, xri are the fixed effects with regressions coefficients β and zri are the covariates corresponding to 
the random effects. If zri = 1, the resulting model is with random intercepts: we allow the error term to vary across individuals. More generally, the 
random effects ui are I realizations from a multivariate normal distribution with mean 0 and variance Σ. The random effects are not directly estimated 
as model parameters but are instead summarized according to the unique elements of Σ, known as variance components. Intuitively, random coef-
ficient models allow for a heterogeneous response to controls and treatments. Finally, H is the identity function for the linear specification and the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function H(v) = Φ(v) for probit. 
Table A5 and Table A6 below report estimates with an expanding set of controls for the laboratory experiment, including treatment interactions, 
interactions with the time variable (rounds of the game) to capture effects that result from learning or experience, and interactions with a quadratic of 
the time variable to capture any nonlinearities in the response to experience. In these tables the belief about others’ cooperation has been normalized 
between 0 and 1. We present results for two-level linear probability model and probit. Random intercepts are included. 
The corresponding marginal effect of the third player presence, as reported in Table A7, is significant and negative, ranging from -0.21 to -0.47, with a 
full set of controls. This signals an overall negative impact on cooperation, which is driven by the interaction of the third player presence and vaccination 
wording. The sign and significance of the estimated coefficients is consistent across linear and probit specifications, with the probit estimates being higher 
in magnitude. Estimates based on specifications that also include random coefficients, i.e. a measure of individual heterogeneity in the response to controls 
and treatments, are available upon request. We found that the results are quite robust to the inclusion of random coefficients. 
We have also run all the regressions with a specification in which the ‘has been passive’ variable could be either ‘has been passive once’ or ‘has been 
passive twice’, to account for Sessions 3, 4, 5, 11 and 12, where all rounds were with the 3-players game. Also in this last case the results are analogous 
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and available upon request. Balance checks also are available upon request.  
Table A5 
Two-Level Linear Estimates   
Dependent variable: vaccination uptake 
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Session fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Demographic 
controls  
✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Health controls  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Risk and social 
preferences 
controls  
✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Observations 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 
Number of 
participants 
374 328 374 328 374 328 374 328 374 328 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  
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Table A6 
Two-Level Probit Estimates   
Dependent variable: vaccination uptake 
































































































































































































































































































Round squared * 







































✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Demographic 
controls  
✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Health controls  ✓  ✓  . ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Risk and social 
preferences 
controls  
✓  ✓  ✓  ✓  . ✓ 
Observations 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 
Number of 
participants 
374 328 374 328 374 328 374 328 374 328 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01.  
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Table A7 
Marginal Effects   
Dependent variable: vaccination uptake 
Model:linear Model:probit 
































































Belief about others’ cooperation   0.281*** 
(0.0277) 
0.306*** 





Has been passive   0.460*** 
(0.0161) 
0.455*** 





Session fixed effects ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Round (quadratic) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Treatment interactions (3*V, 3*VLD, 3*VLH)   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Has been passive, beliefs about others’ cooperation   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Interactions with time (round); linear and quadratic   ✓ ✓   ✓ ✓ 
Demographic controls  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Health controls  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Risk and social preferences controls  ✓  ✓  ✓  ✓ 
Observations 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 11,220 9840 
Number of participants 374 328 374 328 374 328 374 328 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
*p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01 
Appendix B. Supplementary data 
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2021.114195. 
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